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CLASSICAL  AND NEOCLASSICAL  ROOTS OF 
THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM TARIFFS 
Thomas  M.  Hump/my 
In  current  debates  with  protectionists,  pure  or 
unilateral  free  traders  insist  that  unrestricted  com- 
merce  is  optimally  advantageous  not  only  for  the 
world  as a whole  but  for  any  individual  nation,  even 
if it practices  it alone.  From  this  idea  stems  the  cor- 
ollary  that  a country  automatically  benefits  from  the 
unilateral  as well  as reciprocal  elimination  of tariffs. 
If true,  it follows  that,  far from  erecting  tariffs,  a coun- 
try  should  immediately  dismantle  them  and enjoy  the 
benefits  of  international  specialization  and  division 
of  labor  even  if other  nations  do  not. 
In  1940,  however,  the  British  economist  Nicholas 
Kaldor  challenged  these  notions  by  asserting  that  a 
tariff  always  benefits  the  levying  country  provided 
that  the  duty  is not  too  large,  that  the  country  has 
monopoly  power  in world  markets,  and  that  other 
countries  do  not  retaliate  with  tariffs  of their  own.’ 
Kaldor  was  here  advancing  the  terms-of-trade  or 
optimum  tariff  argument  according  to  which  trade 
taxes  improve  the  levying  country’s  welfare  by 
turning  the  commodity  terms  of trade  (relative  price 
at which  exports  exchange  for  imports  or the  quan- 
tity of imports  bought  by a unit  of exports)  in its favor, 
thus  giving  it a better  bargain  in world  markets.  By 
taxing  its  imports,  the  country  reduces  its  demand 
for those  goods  thus  driving  down  their  world  price. 
Similarly,  by  taxing  its  exports  it  lowers  the  quan- 
tity  of those  goods  supplied  on the world  market  thus 
raising  their  price.  In  other  words,  it  acts  as  a 
monopolist  exploiting  an imperfectly  elastic  foreign 
supply  of  its  imports  or  demand  for  its  exports.  In 
so  doing  it  renders  its  imports  cheaper  and  its  ex- 
ports  dearer  such  that  it obtains  a larger  quantity  of 
imports  per  unit  of exports  given  up.  Of course  this 
terms-of-trade  gain  comes  at  the  expense  of  a loss 
in real  trade  volume.  The  optimum  rate  of the  duty 
is that  which  maximizes  the  excess  of the  gain from 
terms-of-trade  improvement  over  the  loss from  lower 
trade  volume  and  reduced  international  division  of 
labor. 
1 N.  Kaldor,  “A  Note  on  Tariffs  and  the  Terms  of  Trade,” 
htwmka,  n.s.  7  (November  1940):  377. 
Kaldor  demonstrated  these  propositions  with  a 
geometrical  diagram  showing  the  tariff-imposing 
country  choosing  to exchange  the  combination  of ex- 
ports  for  imports  that  allows  it  to  reach  its  highest 
attainable  trade  indifference  curve  given  the  offer 
curve  of  the  foreign  country  (see  Figure  1).2 
Shortly  after,  in  1944,  Abba  Lerner  in his Economics 
of COHTVI  described  how  the  same  propositions  could 
be  illustrated  with  conventional  demand  and  supply 
curves  (see  Figure  2). 3  Both  diagrams  quickly 
worked  their  way  into  international  trade  textbooks 
2 Kaldor,  p. 379. 
3 A.P.  Lerner,  Th  Economics of Contmi(New  York,  Macmillan, 
1944),  pp. 357-59. 
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in explaining  the  theory  of the  optimum  tariff.  Little 
was said about  earlier  work  on the  subject.  From  the 
point  of view  of the  textbooks,  the  theory  to  all in- 
tents  and  purposes  largely  dates  from  Kaldor’s 
demonstration.4 
To  set the  record  straight,  one  must  take  issue with 
this  view.  For,  contrary  to the  impression  conveyed 
by textbooks,  optimum  tariff theory  hardly  originated 
with  Kaldor’s  model  but  rather  long  predated  it.  It 
can  be  documented  that  rudimentary  statements  of 
4  Texts  employing  versions  of  the  Kaldor-Lerner  model  with 
no  mention  of  its  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century 
predecessors  include  R.E.  Caves  and  R.W.  Jones,  WorM Trade 
and Payments,  3rd  ed.  (Boston:  Little,  Brown,  and  Co.,  1981), 
pp.  212-13;  H.R.  Heller,  Inzmationai  Trade:  Thory  and 
&pi&al  Etxhzce  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall,  1968) 
pp.  145-47;  CF.  Kindleberger,  In~emationa~Econotni,  rev.  ed. 
(Homewood,  111.:  R.D.  Irwin,  19.58), pp.  617-20;  D.B.  Marsh, 
WorM  Tra& andlnvestmenr  (New York:  Harcourt  Brace,  and Co., 
1951).  pp.  316-20;  and J. Vanek,  Intematimal Tmdk: Thoryand 
Economic PO&  (Homewood,  Ill.: R.D.  Irwin,  1962),  pp.  294-97. 
the  theory  go back  at least  to  the  1830s  and  184Os, 
that  these  statements  were  embodied  in  formal 
economic  models  rather  than  in mere  casual remarks, 
and  that  virtually  all the  elements  of  optimal  tariff 
theory  were  in place  by  1907.  In  short,  the  origins 
of optimum  tariff theory  are to be found  in an earl& 
vintage  of  models  neglected  by  the  textbooks.  A 
systematic  survey  of these  models  helps  clarify  what 
economist  Murray  C.  Kemp  calls the  “confusing  and 
little  known  early  history”  of the  terms-of-trade  argu- 
ment.5  It  also  dispels  the  notion  that  all  leading 
classical  and  neoclassical  trade  theorists  were  doc- 
trinaire  free  traders.  True,  of the  six discussed  below, 
at least four thought  that free trade  was the best policy 
from  a  practical  standpoint.  On  a  purely  abstract 
plane,  however,  all saw the  terms-of-trade  argument 
as a valid theoretical  qualification  to the  doctrine  that 
free  trade  is the  best  of all possible  worlds  for  each 
country. 
HISTORICAL  EVOLUTION 
Early  optimum  tariff  models  evolved  through  five 
distinct  stages.  First  came  the  demonstration  that  im- 
port  duties  improve  the  terms  of trade  either  through 
gold  flows  and  their  effects  on  relative  national  price 
levels  or  by  restricting  import  demand.  Next  came 
the  showing  that  export  taxes  accomplish  the  same 
result  by  restricting  export  supply  and  that  the  ex- 
tent  of terms-of-trade  improvement  depends  crucially 
upon  the  size  of  certain  demand  elasticities.  There 
followed  a geometrical  restatement  of  these  results 
using the  newly  developed  tool of offer curve  analysis. 
Next  appeared  indifference  curve  and  consumer 
surplus  models  measuring  the  gain  from  terms-of- 
trade  improvement  and  specifying  the  tariff rate  that 
maximizes  the  gain.  Finally  came  a  mathematical 
statement  of  the  theory  including  a  rigorous 
demonstration  that  a  tariff  can  improve  national 
welfare  and  a  derivation  of  the  formula  for  the 
optimum  tariff.  Each  stage  saw at least  one  different 
innovator-Torrens,  Mill,  Marshall,  Sidgwick, 
Edgeworth,  and  Bickerdike  being  the  key  names 
here-advance  the  theory. 
ROBERTTORRENS 
Priority  for  being  the  first  to  publish  a  formal 
optimum  tariff  model  goes  to  Robert  Torrens  in 
5  M.C.  Kemp,  ‘“The Gain  from  International  Trade  and  Invest- 
ment:  A  Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin  Approach,”  American Eh~mic 
Revim  56  (September  1966):  788. 
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ceived  that  tariffs  can  turn  the  terms  of trade  in favor 
of the  levying  country.  He  stated  that  idea  as early 
as  18 2 4 in his &says on the Prvdzhon  of Wealth  and 
subsequently  elaborated  it  in  a  series  of  letters 
published  in  the  BoGton  Chnicle  in  1832-33  and 
reprinted  in  his  1833  LRtters on Commercial  Policy. 
Finally,  in Letter  II and  the  Postscript  to  Letter  IX 
of his  1844  Th  Budget, he presented  the  idea  in the 
form  of  a  hypothetical  two-country,  two-good 
model-his  famous  Cuba  case-in  which  he 
showed  that  a  100  percent  tariff,  via  its  effect  on 
reciprocal  demands,  produces  an  equivalent  100 
percent  improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade.6  This 
result  he  depicted  in  two  versions  of  his  model:  a 
monetary  version  involving  specie  flows  and  their 
effects  on local prices  and incomes  and  a pure  barter 
version  involving  trade  in  commodities.  In  the 
monetary  version,  terms-of-trade  improvement 
comes  from  tariff-induced  gold  movements  that  raise 
the  price  of the  protecting  country’s  exports  relative 
to  the  price  of its imports.  In the  barter  version,  the 
same  improvement  comes  from  a reduced  real  de- 
mand  for imports.  Of the  two,  the  monetary  version 
provoked  the  stronger  criticism  from  Torrens’s  free 
trade  contemporaries.  For  that  reason,  it  is  de- 
scribed  in  some  detail  below. 
Torrens’s  Cuba  Model 
In  the  monetary  version  of  his  model,  Torrens 
assumed  that  Cuba  specializes  in producing  sugar and 
England  specializes  in cloth,  both  goods  being  pro- 
duced  under  conditions  of  constant  real  costs.  He 
further  assumed  that  each  good  bears  the  same  duty- 
exclusive  price  wherever  sold,  that  the  prices  of 
home-produced  goods  vary  directly  with  the  quan- 
tity  of  money  in  each  country,  and-of  crucial  im- 
portance  to  the  particular  quantitative  results  he 
obtained-that  each  country’s  demand  for the  other’s 
export  good  is  of  unit  elasticity. 
Employing  these  assumptions,  he  traced  a chain 
of  causation  from  tariff  to  reduced  quantity  of 
imports  bought  to  trade  balance  surplus  to  specie 
inflow  and  thence  to  a rise  in  the  price  of  the  pro- 
tecting  country’s  exports  relative  to  the  price  of its 
imports.  More  precisely,  he  supposed  that,  starting 
from  a situation  of balanced  free  trade  with  England, 
6  On  Torrens’s  Cuba  model,  see  D.P.  O’Brien’s  The CZ&aZ 
Economir~ (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1975), pp.  191-94; 
L.C.  Robbins’s  Robert  Torrnrc and  the Evolution of  Classical 
Ecwokcs  (London:  Macmillan,  1958),  pp.  199-203;  and  J. 
Viner’s  Studies in the Thor-y of  Znrmational Trade (New  York. 
Harper,  1937),  pp.  298-99,  322,  463. 
Cuba  imposes  a 100 percent  ad valorem  duty  on im- 
ports  of  English  cloth.  That  good  being  produced 
at  constant  cost,  the  immediate  result  is to  double 
its price  in Cuba  causing  the  quantity  demanded  to 
fall  by  half,  the  Cuban  demand  for  cloth  being 
assumed  by Torrens  to be of unit  elasticity.  In other 
words,  Cubans’  total  expenditure  (price-times- 
quantity)  on taxed  cloth  remains  unchanged;  but  only 
half that  outlay  goes  to  English  exporters,  the  other 
half being  intercepted  by  the  Cuban  government  at 
the  customs  house. 
But these  are only proximate  or first-round  effects. 
Later-round  effects  ensue.  For,  given  the  volume  of 
Cuban  exports,  the  halving  of  her  import  bill  pro- 
duces  a favorable  trade  balance  with  England  and  a 
compensating  specie  flow  from  that  country  lower- 
ing  general  prices  in  England  and  raising  them  in 
Cuba.  Since  the  price  of each  country’s  exportable 
commodity  moves  with  its  general  price  level  and 
since  identical  exportable  goods  bear  the  same 
(duty  adjusted)  price  in all markets,  the  price  of sugar 
rises  in Cuba  (and  England)  while  the  price  of cloth 
falls  in  England  (and  Cuba). 
The  fall in the  price  of cloth  together  with  the  rise 
in Cuban  money  incomes  occasioned  by  the  specie 
flow raises  the  quantity  of cloth  demanded  in Cuba. 
Conversely,  the  rise  in sugar  prices  combined  with 
the  fall in English  incomes  reduces  the  quantity  of 
sugar  demanded  in England.  Gold  continues  to flow 
from  England  to Cuba,  lowering  incomes  in the  one 
and  raising  them  in the  other  and  likewise  lowering 
cloth  prices  and raising sugar prices,  until the resulting 
stimulus  to  cloth  sales  and  check  to  sugar  sales 
restores  trade  balance  equilibrium. 
In the  new  equilibrium,  Cuba  imports  the  original 
quantity  of  English  cloth  at  two-thirds  the  original 
unit price  (four-thirds  including  duty)  but exports  only 
half  the  initial  quantity  of  sugar  at  four-thirds  the 
initial unit price.  In barter  terms,  Cuba  purchases  the 
same  real quantity  of imports  at the  cost  of only  half 
the  initial  quantity  of  exports  given  up,  her  com- 
modity  terms  of trade  having  improved  100 percent. 
England’s  terms  of trade  of course  deteriorate  by the 
same  amount. 
Barter  Version  of Torrens’s  Model 
Torrens  derived  exactly  the  same  results  in  the 
pure  barter  version  of his model,  which  he elaborated 
with  great  precision  in his Postscript  to Letter  IX of 
Th  Budget. There  he.argued  (1) that  the  equilibrium 
terms  of trade  must  lie between  the  comparative  cost 
ratios  in  the  two  countries,  (2)  that  the  precise 
location  of that  equilibrium  depends  upon  each  coun- 
try’s reciprocal  demand  for the  product  of the  other, 
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of the  country  with  the  weakest  reciprocal  demand, 
and  (4)  that  a tariff,  by  reducing  the  levying  coun- 
try’s  reciprocal  demand,  turns  the  terms  of trade  in 
its favor.  Although  he  drew  no  diagrams  himself,  the 
essentials  of  his  analysis  can  be  depicted  with  the 
aid of Marshallian  reciprocal  demand  or offer  curves 
showing  the  determination  of the  equilibrium  terms 
of  trade  by  the  intersection  of  the  two  curves  (see 
Figure  3). 
As drawn,  the  curves  differ from  offer  curves  found 
in  standard  textbooks  in  two  respects.  First,  they 
bend  toward  equilibrium  only  at  the  points  on  the 
respective  internal  comparative  cost  ratio  lines  at 
which  the  countries  would  operate  in  the  absence 
of  trade.  Second,  within  the  range  at  which  trade 
occurs  they  take  the  form  of horizontal  and  vertical 
straight  lines  reflecting  Torrens’s  assumption  of unit 
elastic  reciprocal  demands.  Given  these  elasticities 
and  starting  from  free  trade  equilibrium,  Cuba’s  tariff 
shifts  her  effective  offer  curve  down  to half its initial 
level  thus  producing  at  the  original  terms  of  trade 
an  excess  world  demand  for  sugar  and  a  corre- 
sponding  excess  supply  of cloth.  To  eliminate  these 
excess  supplies  and demands  England’s terms  of trade 
deteriorate  by  100 percent.  In the  new  equilibrium 
England  imports  half  the  initial  quantity  of sugar  at 
the  cost  of the  same  initial amount  of cloth  given  up. 
Here  is the  key  idea of optimum  tariff models;  namely 
that  trade  taxes  influence  reciprocal  demands  which 
determine  the  terms  of trade  thus  allowing  govern- 
ments  to  manipulate  those  terms. 
Money  Stock  Implications 
The  foregoing  terms-of-trade  effects  were  im- 
portant.  To  Torrens,  however,  they  were  over- 
shadowed  by the  impact  of Cuba’s  tariff on England’s 
money  stock.  In the  monetary  version  of his model 
he  explains  how  the  redistribution  of  specie  occa- 
sioned  by  the  tariff  produces  a one-third  expansion 
of Cuba’s money  stock  and a corresponding  one-third 
contraction  of  England’s  No  country,  he  thought, 
could  endure  a  monetary  contraction  of  such 
magnitude.  For  the  resulting  collapse  of  product 
prices  would  bring  ruinous  rises  in  the  real  burden 
of debts,  wages,  taxes,  and other  fixed  charges  whose 
nominal  values  are sticky  and thus  respond  sluggishly 
to  deflationary  pressure.  Economic  stagnation, 
“national  bankruptcy,  and  revolution  would  be  the 
probable  results.“’ 
Reciprocity  in  Commercial  Policy 
Having  shown  how  England  might  lose  from 
foreign  tariffs, Torrens  next  used  his analysis  to argue 
for  reciprocity  in tariff  removal.  He  pointed  out  (1) 
that  a unilateral  abolition  of tariffs  would,  like  their 
foreign  imposition,  worsen  the  home  country’s  terms 
of trade  and  reduce  its  money  stock,  (2)  that  equal 
retaliatory  duties  would  cancel  the  unfavorable  terms- 
of-trade  and  monetary  effects  of foreign  levies,  and 
(3)  that  the  simultaneous  removal  of  duties  by  all 
countries  tends  to leave  money  stocks  and the  terms 
of trade  unchanged  (see  Figure  4). On  these  grounds 
7 R.  Torrens,  Letter  II  of  Tk  Budget.  On  Commernal and 
Cohial  Policy. (London:  Smith,  Elder  and  Co.,  No.  65, 
Cornhill,  1844),  p.  37. 
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equal  duties  of  her  own,  that  she  trade  freely  only 
with countries  admitting  her goods  duty  free,  and that 
she  drop  her  tariffs  only  insofar  as her  trading  part- 
ners  abolish  theirs. 
Criticisms 
Torrens’s  analysis  was  unsympathetically  re- 
ceived  by  his  contemporaries  who  feared  it  would 
undermine  the  case  for  free  trade.  His  critics 
refused  to  accept  policy  conclusions  drawn  from  a 
two-by-two  model  regarded  by them  as an inaccurate 
representation  of a world  economy  characterized  by 
many  goods  and  many  countries.  Herman  Merivale 
argued  that  competition  from  third  countries  pro- 
ducing  sugar  for export  would  limit  Cuba’s  power  to 
manipulate  the  terms  of trade.8  Also  England  could 
s  H.  Merivale,  L.ectures  w1 Cobtzization  and Colonies,  II, 1842,  pp. 
308ff.  On  Merivale’s  criticisms  see  Viner,  Studies, p.  322  and 
Robbins,  Robert Torren,  pp.  209-11. 
avoid  Cuba’s  tariff  by  selling  to  third  countries  and 
exporting  goods  other  than  taxed  cloth,  such  alter- 
natives  being  possible  in a multi-good,  multi-country 
model.  This  point  was made  by Nassau  Senior  who 
also  noted  that  what  Cuba  gains  through  terms-of- 
trade  improvement  might  be outweighed  by her  loss 
of productivity  and  competitiveness  due  to reduced 
international  specialization  and  division  of  labor.9 
The  most  cogent  criticism,  however,  came  from 
George  Warde  Norman.  He  noted  that  England’s 
terms  of  trade  would  hardly  deteriorate  to  the 
extent  claimed  by  Torrens  if  one  dropped  the 
assumption  of unit  elastic  demands.  He  also argued 
that the logic of Torrens’s  model  implied  that England 
should  levy  not  equal  but  higher  tariffs  than  those 
levied  abroad  to improve  the  terms  of trade  and that 
such  action  would  intensify  the  danger  of a trade  war 
with  all  parties  losing. lo  These  criticisms  were 
telling.  For  Torrens  indeed  had  overlooked  the 
possibility  of  trade  warfare  and  the  likelihood  that 
highly  elastic  reciprocal  demand  schedules  would  in 
the  long run  severely  limit the  effectiveness  of tariffs. 
JOHN  STUART  MILL 
Although  Torrens’s  Cuba  case  was  the  first 
optimum  tariff  model  to  appear  in  print,  it  was 
hardly  the  first formulated.  Already  in 1829-30,  some 
fifteen  years  earlier,  John  Stuart  Mill had constructed 
a similar  model  which  he subsequently  presented  in 
the  first  of  his  Essays on Some Unsettld Questions  in 
PoliticalEconomy,  a volume  he  published  in  1844  in 
response  to  Torrens’s  Th  Budget. 
Mill’s  model  possessed  most  of  the  features  of 
the  monetary  version  of  Torrens’s  Cuba  model, 
namely  two  countries,  two  goods,  complete 
specialization,  constant  costs,  law  of  one  price, 
Hume’s  price-specie-flow  mechanism,  and  quantity 
theory  of money.  But Mill greatly  enriched  the  model 
by permitting  demand  elasticities  to range  from  zero 
to infinity  and  by incorporating  export  as well as im- 
port  taxes  into  the  analysis.  In  so  doing,  he  ex- 
panded  the  model’s  explanatory  power  thus  en- 
abling  it to cover  a greater  variety  of cases  than  con- 
9 N.  Senior,  “Free  Trade  and  Retaliation,”  E&hrg/r  Review 
88 (July  1843):  12-15,  29-35.  On  Senior’s  analysis  see  O’Brien, 
The Ckzssicaal  Economists,  pp.  194-95. 
lo  G.W.  Norman,  Remarks  on the Incidence  of Import Duties  with 
special  Refirence to the &gland  and  Cuba Case contained  in  “T/re 
Budget, “privately  printed  (London:  T.  and  W.  Boone,  29 New 
Bond  Street,  1860),  pp.  8,  12-19.  On  Norman’s  criticisms,  see 
O’Brien,  The C/as&a/ Economists,  pp.  19596. 
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different  elasticities  affect  the  degree  of  terms-of- 
trade  improvement. 
Export  Taxes,  Foreign  Demand  Elasticities, 
and  the  Terms  of Trade 
Mill  applied  his  model  first  to  export  taxes,  con- 
cluding  that  such  taxes  tend  to  improve  the  taxing 
country’s  terms  of trade  by  an amount  equal  to,  more 
than,  or less than the  tax as the  elasticity  of the  foreign 
demand  for exports  is equal  to,  less  than,  or greater 
than  one.”  To  demonstrate,  he  employed  an  ex- 
ample  in which  England  exports  cloth  to and imports 
linen  from  Germany.  In  his  example,  he  as- 
sumed  that  England  levies  a tax  on  her  exports  of 
cloth  to Germany.  Cloth  being  produced  in England 
at  constant  real  cost,  its  price  to  Germans  rises 
initially  by  the  amount  of  the  tax.  Provided  the 
German  demand  for  cloth  is of  unit  elasticity  such 
that  her  import  expenditure  on  that  good  remains 
unchanged  after  the  tax raises  its price,  there  results 
no disturbance  to the  balance  of payments  requiring 
equilibrating  specie  flows  and  further  adjustments  in 
the  prices  of the  traded  goods.  Cloth  prices  paid  to 
England  consequently  remain  above  their  pre-duty 
levels  by  exactly  the  amount  of the  tax.  And  there 
being  no change  in the price  of England’s import  good 
(linen),  her  terms  of  trade-that  is,  the  ratio  of the 
price  of  cloth  to  the  price  of  linen-improves 
exactly  by the  amount  of the  tax.  In short,  unit  elastic 
German  demand  ensures  a terms-of-trade  improve- 
ment  equiproportional  to  the  tax. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  Germany’s  demand  for 
English  cloth  is inelastic  such  that  she  spends  more 
on  that  good  when  the  tax  boosts  its price,  her  im- 
port  bill  will  rise  producing  a  deficit  in  her  trade 
balance.  The  resulting  flow of specie  from  Germany 
to  England  will,  via  the  operation  of  the  quantity 
theory  of money  and  the  law of one  price,  raise  fur- 
ther  the  price  of  cloth  and  lower  the  price  of  linen 
in both  countries.  England  will purchase  more  of the 
cheaper  linen  and  sell less  of the  dearer  cloth,  these 
demand  readjustments  acting  to restore  trade  balance 
equilibrium.  In the  new equilibrium,  England  receives 
a price  for  her  cloth  raised  by  more  than  the  tax.  As 
she will also be paying  a lower price  for German  lien, 
her  terms  of trade-the  relative  price  of cloth  exports 
to  linen  imports-will  have  improved  by  more  than 
the  tax. 
11 J.S.  Mii,  EcMys~~sMne(Ins~~~ti~inPo/itica/Econmny 
(1844),  (London:  London  School  of  Economics  and  Political 
Science,  1948),  pp.  21-24. 
Finally,  if Germany’s  demand  for  English  cloth  is 
elastic  such  that  she  spends  less  on  it when  the  tax 
raises  its price,  her  import  bill will shrink  producing 
a surplus  in her  trade  balance  and  a corresponding 
specie  flow from  England.  The  result  of this  money 
flow  is to  lower  the  world  price  of cloth  and  to  raise 
the  world  price  of  linen-these  price  changes  con- 
tinuing  until cloth  sales are stimulated  and linen  sales 
checked  sufficiently  to  restore  trade  balance 
equilibrium.  With  England’s  export  prices  somewhat 
lower  than  they  were  immediately  after  the  impo- 
sition  of  the  tax  and  her  import  prices  somewhat 
higher,  her  terms  of trade  have  improved  but  by  less 
than  the  amount  of  the  tax. 
Mill’s  Model  in  Barter  Terms 
The  foregoing  conclusions  can  be  presented  in 
barter  terms,  although  why  Mill  himself  did  not  do 
so is something  of a mystery  since  he  applied  barr.er 
analysis  involving  his  notion  of  reciprocal  demand 
schedules  to  other  problems  of trade  theory.  In any 
case,  Figure  5  shows  England’s  terms  of  trade  im- 
proving  in greater,  equal,  or lesser  proportion  to the 
export  tax  as  the  German  offer  curve  is backward 
bending  (i.e.,  inelastic),  vertical  (of  unit  elasticicy), 
or upward  sloping  (elastic),  respectively-just  as Mill’s 
monetary  model  predicts. 
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Mill  admitted  but  one  exception  to  the  rule  that 
export  taxes  improve  the  taxing  country’s  terms  of 
trade:  the  case of an elastic  German  demand  for cloth 
combined  with  an inelastic  English  demand  for linen. 
Here  the  specie  flow  from  England  caused  by  the 
tax-induced  decline  in Germany’s  spending  on cloth 
is not  self-correcting  but rather  is self-reinforcing.  For 
the  faster  gold  flows  abroad  to  raise  the  price  of 
German  linen,  the  more  England  spends  on that com- 
modity.  And  the  more  she  spends,  the  greater  her 
loss  of gold  and  the  greater  the  resulting  fall in  the 
price  of her  cloth.  To  restore  equilibrium,  cloth  may 
have  to  fall so low  in price  relative  to  linen  that  the 
terms  of trade  turn  against  England  by  more  than  the 
amount  of  the  tax.  Such  would  be  the  case,  Mill 
thought,  should  Germany’s  expenditure  on cloth  be 
so insensitive  to changes  in income  that  prices  alone 
had  to  bear  the  full  burden  of  adjustment. 
Import  Tariffs  and  the  Terms  of Trade 
Having  examined  the  terms-of-trade  effects  of 
England’s  export  taxes,  Mill  next  turned  his  atten- 
tion  to  her  import  tariffs.12  He  concluded  that  they 
invariably  improve  her  terms  of trade  except  in the 
singular  case  of a totally  inelastic  English  demand  for 
German  linen.  But  as long  as England’s  demand  is 
of  greater  than  zero  elasticity,  quantity  of  imports 
demanded  falls as the  tariff  raises  price.  Since  Ger- 
man  exporters  producing  under  conditions  of  con- 
stant  cost  receive  a sum  equal  to  the  lower  (post- 
tariff)  quantity  times  the  old  (pre-tariff)  price,  it 
follows  that  England’s  import  bill falls. The  resulting 
gold  flow  from  Germany  to  England  lowers  linen’s 
supply  price  and  raises  the  price  of  cloth,  thus 
improving  England’s  terms  of  trade.  No  such 
improvement  would  occur,  however,  if  England’s 
import  demand  were  perfectly  inelastic  such  that  the 
quantity  of  linen  demanded  by  that  country  re- 
mained  unchanged  when  the  tariff  raised  its  price. 
With  no  shrinkage  in quantity  demanded,  the  price- 
times-quantity  sum paid  to German  exporters  would 
be the  same  as before,  which  means  that  there  would 
be  no  disturbance  to  the  balance  of  payments  re- 
quiring  gold  flows  and  hence  no  changes  in  the 
absolute  and  relative  prices  of  cloth  and  linen.  In 
other  words,  England’s  import  bill,  and  hence  her 
terms  of trade,  would  remain  unchanged  in this case. 
12 Mill,  pp. 26-27. 
Views  on  Tariff  Policy 
To  summarize,  Mill,  like  Torrens,  had  clearly 
established  the  theoretical  possibility  of  a  country 
improving  its terms  of trade  and  its welfare  through 
trade  restriction.  Interestingly  enough,  however,  Mill 
opposed  the  application  of his optimum  tariff theory 
to commercial  policy  on practical  and moral  grounds. 
Tariffs,  he  said,  invite  retaliatory  duties  that  not 
only  nullify  the  initial  terms-of-trade  improvement, 
but  also  bring  costly  reductions  in  the  volume  of 
world  trade.13  Even  in  the  absence  of  retaliation, 
tariffs  are  unjust  because  one  country’s  gain  is 
another’s  loss.  Moreover,  as the  rest  of the  world’s 
loss  exceeds  the  dutying  country’s  gain  the  tariff  is 
inimical  to global welfare  and cannot  be justified  from 
a cosmopolitan  point  of view.  In his words,  “if inter- 
national  morality  .  .  . were  rightly  understood  and 
acted  upon,  such  taxes,  as  being  contrary  to  the 
universal  weal,  would  not  exist.“14 He  did,  however, 
agree  with Torrens  that  reciprocity  was a prime  con- 
sideration  in the  decision  to remove  tariffs.  “A coun- 
try,”  he  said,  “cannot  be  expected  to  renounce  the 
power  of taxing  foreigners,  unless  foreigners  will in 
return  practice  towards  itself  the  same  forbearance. 
The  only  mode  in  which  a country  can  save  itself 
from  being  a loser  by  the  revenue  duties  imposed 
by  other  countries  on  its commodities,  is to  impose 
corresponding  revenue  duties  on  theirs.“‘5 
ALFRED  MARSHALL 
AND 
HENRY  SIDGWICK 
In the  1870s  and  1880s  Alfred Marshall  and Henry 
Sidgwick  constructed  optimum  tariff  models.  Mar- 
shall’s innovation  was to transform  Mill’s model  into 
geometry,  expressing  his results  in terms  of reciprocal 
demand  or offer  curves  showing  each  nation’s  desired 
quantity  of exports  and  imports  as a function  of the 
terms  of trade.  Sidgwick  too  expressed  some  of Mill’s 
conclusions  in  purely  barter  terms,  but  without 
adding  much  to  his  analysis. 
Marshall,  in an unpublished  manuscript  which  Pro- 
fessor  John  Whitaker  dates  at 1872-74,  employed  his 
reciprocal  demand  curves  to  show  that  when  both 
curves  are  elastic  (provided  the  foreign  curve  is not 
infinitely  so) a tax  on  imports  or exports  always  im- 
I3 Mill,  pp. 28-29. 
I4 Mill,  p. 25. 
‘5 Mill,  p.  29. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  23 proves  the  terms  of  trade  of  the  levying  country.16 
He  also  showed  that  when  the  foreign  curve  is 
inelastic-meaning  that  the  foreign  country  bffers  a 
greater  total  quantity  of  its  exports  as  its  terms  of 
trade  deteriorate-then  the  dutying  country  enjoys 
a  two-fold  gain. l7 Not  only  do  its  terms  of  trade 
improve,  but,  by  obtaining  a larger  total  quantity  of 
imports  and  sacrificing  a smaller  total  quantity  of its 
exports,  it  has  more  of  both  goods  to  consume  at 
home  (see  Figure  6). A country  lucky  enough  to face 
an  inelastic  foreign  offer  curve,  said  Marshall,  has 
nothing  to lose and everything  to gain by exploiting  it. 
In  general,  however,  Marshall  thought  that  the 
ability  of the  taxed  country  in a multi-country,  multi- 
commodity  world  to  switch  its  production  to  non- 
taxed  exports  and  to  trade  its  goods  in  nontaxed 
markets  rendered  its offer  curve  so highly  elastic  as 
to  leave  the  dutying  country  little  scope  for  tariff- 
induced  improvements  in the  terms  of trade.  He  also 
feared  that  the  pressure  of  special  interests  would 
push  tariff  rates  far  above  the  optimum  level  such 
‘6 J.K.  Whitaker  (ed.),  Th  Eony Ecommk Witings of&edMar- 
shall, 1867-1890, Vol.  1 (New  York:  Free  Press,  1973,  p,  270. 
I7 Whitaker,  pp.  275-76. 
that  the  dutying  country  as well  as the  whole  world 
would  lose. 
Sidgwick’s  analysis  closely  followed  that  of  Mar- 
shall,  from  whose  abandoned  1873-77  manuscript 
on trade  theory  Sidgwick  had printed  for private  cir- 
culation  selected  chapters  under  the  title  Th  Put-e 
Thoty of Foreign Truth (1879).  In particular,  Sidgwick 
stressed  three  points  previously  made  by  Marshall. 
First  is  the  importance  of  monopsony  power  in 
achieving  terms-of-trade  improvement.  No  country, 
he  said,  could  expect  to  improve  its  terms  of  trade 
by  means  of tariff  unless  it “supplied  a considerable 
part  of the  whole  demand  for the  [taxed]  foreign  prod- 
ucts.“18  Second,  a  tariff  affects  the  terms  of  trade 
through  its  impact  on  reciprocal  demands.  Specifi- 
cally, A’s tariff reduces  her  demand  for B’s good,  thus 
producing  an excess  world  supply  of that  good.  This 
excess  supply  is only  eliminated  by  a deterioration 
in  B’s terms  of  trade. 
Supposing  trade  to  be  in  equilibrium  at  the  time  that  the 
demand  in  A  for  B’s commodities  is  artificially  restricted 
by  import  duties  raising  their  price,  and  supposing  that 
other  things-including  the  demand  in B for A’s commodi- 
ties-remain  unchanged,  one  obvious  result  will be  that  B 
will  import  more  than  she  exports;  hence  in  order  to 
restore  the  balance  of  trade,  a  certain  readjustment  of 
prices  will  be  necessary  by  which  B  will  in  most  cases 
tend  to  obtain  a  somewhat  smaller  aggregate  of  imports 
on  somewhat  less  advantageous  terms.19 
Third,  the  effectiveness  of  A’s tariff  depends  upon 
the  elasticity  of B’s offer  curve.  If that  curve  is almost 
totally  inelastic,  as when  B urgently  requires  A’s good 
at  any  price,  the  terms-of-trade  gain  realized  by  A 
comes  at the  cost  of little  or no  shrinkage  in her  ex- 
port  volume.  But if B’s offer  curve  is perfectly  elastic, 
as when  she can readily  substitute  third-country  goods 
for  A’s good  in her  consumption  mix,  A’s tariff  will 
have  no  effect  other  than  diminishing  her  (A’s) real 
trade  volume.  Said  Sidgwick: 
This  restriction  on  B’s  import  trade  may  possibly  not 
reduce  materially  the  amount  of  her  imports  from  A,  if 
the  commodities  supplied  by  A are  strongly  demanded  in 
B  .  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand  .  .  .  if the  products  of  A  are 
closely  pressed  in  the  markets  of B by  the  competition  of 
other  countries,  the  protection  given  by  A  to  .  .  .  her 
industry  may  very  likely  have  the  secondary  effect  of 
inflicting  a blow  upon  .  .  .  the  exports  from  A  to  B.zo 
Here  is Sidgwick’s  recognition  of one  point  stressed 
by  optimum  tariff  theory,  namely  that  a  tariff  is 
powerless  to  improve  the  terms  of  trade  when  the 
foreign  offer  curve  is perfectly  elastic. 
1s H.  Sidgwick,  T/l  PrinGipl  of Poktical  Economy,  2nd  edition 
(London:  Macmillan  and  Company,  Ltd.,  1887),  p.  492. 
19 Sidgwick,  pp.  494-95. 
z”  Sidgwick,  p.  495. 
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Although  Torrens,  Mill,  Marshall,  and  Sidgwick 
had  shown  that  tariffs  could  benefit  the  dutying 
country  by turning  the  terms  of trade  in its favor  they 
did not provide  a measure  of this benefit  nor  did they 
specify  the  precise  tariff  rate  that  would  maximize 
it.  Not  until  1894  did  these  ideas  make  their  first 
appearance  with the  publication  of F. Y. Edgeworth’s 
famous  Economic Jounu1  article  on “The  Pure  Theory 
of  International  Values.”  There  in a demonstration 
that  anticipated  Kaldor’s  in all essential  respects,  he 
employed  the  now-standard  curves  of trade  geometry 
to  identify  the  optimum  tariff  (see  Figure  7).  In  so 
doing  he  advanced  the  theory  in at least  four  ways. 
First,  he superimposed  on Marshall’s reciprocal  de- 
mand  or offer  curves  trade  indifference  curves  essen- 
tial to the  demonstration  of welfare  gains from  trade 
restriction.  His  diagram  shows  the  home  country’s 
trade  indifference  curve  i, passing  through  the  free 
trade  point  P at which  the  offer  curves  intersect  the 
(free-trade)  terms-of-trade  line.21  This  particular 
z1 F.Y.  Edgeworth,  “The  Theory  of International  Values,  II,” 
EconotnicJowna~4 (September  1894):  432.  The  same  diagram 
appears  in his  Papers  Rdating to Political  Economy,  Vol.  2,  (Lon- 
don:  Macmillan,  1925),  p.  39. 
indifference  curve,  he  said,  indicates  the  level  of 
welfare  or satisfaction  the  home  country  enjoys  under 
free  trade.  It  provides  a  benchmark  against  which 
to  compare  alternative  welfare  levels  yielded  by 
different  degrees  of  trade  restriction. 
Second,  he  specified  the  range  of  tariff  rates 
beneficial  to the  home  country.  To  do  so,  he  noted 
that  the  same  indifference  curve  that  passes  through 
the  free-trade  point  P also cuts  the  foreign  offer  curve 
at point  M,  which,  by  virtue  of  being  on  the  same 
indifference  curve,  yields  the  same  level  of welfare 
as the  free  trade  point.  Since  all points  on the  foreign 
offer  curve  between  these  two extremes  lie on higher 
indifference  curves,  it follows  that  any movement  to 
a position  between  points  P and  M will result  in the 
home  country  being  better  off than  under  free  trade. 
In  other  words,  points  P  and  M  mark  the  range  of 
terms-of-trade  improvement  beneficial  to the  home 
country.  Somewhere  within  this  range  benefit  is at 
a  maximum. 
Third,  he identified  the  point  Q at which  the  home 
country  reaches  its highest  possible  trade  indifference 
curve  given  the  foreign  offer  curve.  The  optimum 
tariff, said Edgeworth,  is that which  distorts  the  home 
country’s  offer curve  such that  it intersects  the  foreign 
offer  curve  at this  point  of tangency  with  the  highest 
attainable  indifference  curve.  Here,  almost  fifty years 
before  Kaldor  himself  presented  it,  is  the  famous 
tangency  solution  to  the  determination  of  the  op- 
timum  tariff. 
Fourth,  Edgeworth  showed  that  if the  tariff is raised 
too  much  it  reduces  rather  than  increases  welfare. 
For  as the  tariff  is raised  from  point  P  to  Q  to  M, 
welfare  at first  rises,  reaches  a maximum,  and  starts 
to  fall.  And  if the  tariff  is raised  beyond  point  M, 
welfare  falls below  the  level  attained  at the  free  trade 
position  P.  It follows  that  the  tariff  must  not  be  too 
large  if the  nation  is to  benefit. 
Finally,  he  noted  some  pitfalls  in  the  practical 
application  of the  model.  For  one  thing,  the  optimum 
point,  though  precisely  identifiable  in  theory, 
cannot  be  ascertained  with  any  accuracy  in practice. 
Another  consideration  is  the  strong  political  pres- 
sure  exerted  by  protectionists.  These  factors  make 
it  all  too  likely  that  policymakers  would  raise 
tariffs  far beyond  the  optimum  point  thus  lowering 
welfare.  Then  too  there  was the  likelihood  of retalia- 
tion  which  would  nullify  any  gains  generated  by  the 
tariff.  Above  all was  the  immorality  of  tariffs  from 
the  cosmopolitan  point  of view;  there  is little  to  be 
said for restrictions  that  cause  other  countries  to lose 
more  than  the  dutying  country  gains.22  Taking  all 
22 Edgeworth,  Papers II,  pp.  17  (n.S),  18. 
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remains  hands  down  the  best  and  most  practical 
policy  for  a nation  to  follow. 
C.  F.  BICKERDIKE 
The  last  economist  to  be  considered  is  C.  F. 
Bickerdike,  who  in  his  1906  Economic  Journal 
article  on  “The  Theory  of Incipient  Taxes”  and  his 
1907  Review  of A.  C.  Pigou’s  Pmtective  and Prefer- 
ential Import D.&s  contributed  at least  four  innova- 
tions  to optimum  tariff  theory.  First,  he emphasized 
the  similarity  between  the  theory  of monopoly  and 
the  theory  of tariffs.  He  noted  that when  an individual 
exporter  expands  his sales  he  drives  down  the  price 
received  by  other  exporters.  An  export  tax,  he 
claimed,  corrects  this  tendency  for  competition 
among  exporters  to  lower  the  price  obtained  by  all. 
It  does  so  by  extracting  from  the  gross  price  re- 
ceived  by  exporters  the  amount  by  which  an  extra 
unit  sold  lowers  the  price  on  all previous  units.  In 
so  doing,  the  duty  forces  exporters  to  behave  as if 
they  take  account  of  their  collective  influence  on 
prices  paid  by foreigners.  The  result  is that  the  coun- 
try  acts  as a single  monopoly  unit  that  fully  exploits 
its bargaining  power  to improve  the  terms  of trade.a3 
In  effect,  the  export  tax  acts  to  form  competing 
exporters  into  a cartel. 
Second,  he  specified  anew  the  welfare  gain  from 
trade  restriction.  As an alternative  to Edgeworth’s  in- 
difference  curve  measure,  he defined  the  net  benefit 
of  an  import  duty  as  the  sum  of  the  tax  revenue 
collected  from  foreigners  through  lower  import  prices 
less  the  deadweight  loss  in  consumers’  surplus 
caused  by the  shrinkage  in trade  volume.  This  welfare 
gain  he  illustrated  in  a  Marshallian  demand-and- 
supply  curve  diagram  (see  Figure  8)  in  which 
crosshatched  rectangular  area  2  measures  tariff 
revenue  collected  from  foreigners  and  shaded 
triangular  area  3  is the  deadweight  loss in consumers’ 
surplus.*4  To  avoid  Torrens-Mill  type  specie  flow 
and price  level  movements-complications  that  could 
shift  the  demand  and  supply  curves  in Figure  8-he 
assumed  that  each  country  operated  with  an incon- 
vertible  paper  currency  of constant  purchasing  power. 
As  noted  by  John  Chipman,  this  assumption  effec- 
tively  transformed  a  partial  equilibrium  diagram 
into  a  consistent  general  equilibrium  model.z5 
23 C.F.  Bickerdike,  “The  Theory  of Incipient  Taxes,”  Ibn~nzi~ 
Journal  16  (December  1906):  530-3 1. 
z4 Bickerdike,  p.  533-34. 
25 J.S.  Chipman,  “Bickerdike’s  Theory  of Incipient  and  Optimal 
Tariffs,”  unpublished  paper,  1987. 
In any case,  Bickerdike  concluded  from his diagram 
that  a tariff  benefits  the  dutying  country  whenever 
rectangle  2 exceeds  triangle  3 in size,  which  will be 
the  case  provided  the  tariff  is  small  enough,  the 
demand  curve  is of greater-than-zero  elasticity,  and 
the  import  supply  curve  is not  infinitely  elastic.  He 
also  concluded  that  the  tariff  is more  beneficial  the 
more  elastic  the  levying  country’s  demand  for  im- 
ports.  This  is  true  because  the  more  elastic  the 
demand  curve  the  larger  the  foreigner’s  tariff-burden 
rectangle  relative  to the  deadweight  loss triangle.  In 
the  limiting  case  of  infinitely  elastic  demand, 
foreigners  would  bear  the  entire  burden  of the  tariff 
and  deadweight  loss  would  be  zero. 
Third,  he provided  the  frst  mathematical  proof  rhat 
a  country  could  gain  from  a  tariff.  To  obtain  his 
proof  he  constructed  a two-country,  two-commodity 
algebraic  model  consisting  of five groups  of equations. 
These  included  (1)  export  and  import  demand  and 
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dition,  (3) a law-of-one-price  ,equation  stating  that  the 
foreign  exchange  rate  must  be  such  as  to  equalize 
the  common  currency  price  (tariff-adjusted)  of each 
good  across  countries,  (4)  a tariff  equation  defining 
the  percentage  tariff  wedge  inserted  between  the 
prices  domestic  importers  pay  and  foreign  suppliers 
receive,  and  (5) a collective  utility  function  defining 
national  welfare  as the  excess  of the  total  utility  from 
consuming  import  goods  over  the  cost  of obtaining 
that  utility  through  the  production  of  exports.26 
Having  constructed  his  model,  he  then  had  to 
demonstrate  that  national  welfare  increases  upon  a 
small increase  in the  tariff.  This  he  accomplished  by 
substituting  equations  (1)  through  (4)  into  the 
utility  function,  differentiating  that  function  with 
respect  to  the  tariff,  and  then  showing  that  the 
resulting  first  derivative  is positive.  His  expression 
reveals  the  welfare  gain as depending  critically  upon 
export  supply  and import  demand  elasticities  at home 
and  abroad. 
Last  but  not  least  he expressed  the  optimum  tariff 
rate  in terms  of  a mathematical  formula,  being  the 
first  to  do  so.  To  derive  his  optimum  tariff  formula 
he  set  the  foregoing  first  derivative  of  utility  with 
respect  to  the  tariff rate  equal  to zero  as required  for 
a maximum  and  solved  for  the  tariff  rate  (or  more 
precisely  for  the  reciprocal  of  one  plus  the  tariff 
rate-this  term  being  his measure  of the  tariff wedge). 
The  result  was 
T  =  1 -(h*) 
1 -W%) 
where  T  is the  reciprocal  of one  plus  the  optimum 
tariff  rate  t, or  l/( 1 + t),  and qa and  q0 denote  the  ex- 
port  demand  and  import  supply  elasticities  of  the 
foreign  country.  z7 Solving  this  formula  for  the  tariff 
rate  t  yields  the  expression 
t 
=  l/y+l/c 
1 -l/c 
where  q =  -q.  and  E  = ye. Here  is the  classic  formula 
for  the  optimum  tariff  later  made  famous  by  R.  F. 
Kahn,  J.  de  V.  Graaff,  and  Harry  G.  Johnson  in the 
1940s  and  195Os.28 
z6 Bickerdike,  Review  of Protective  and Pqbntial  Itnpoti  Duties 
by  A.C.  Pigou,  Economic  JoumaZ 17  (March  1907):  100. 
2’  Bickerdike,  Review,  p.  101. 
28 See  R.F.  Kahn,  “Tariffs  and  the  Terms  of Trade,”  Rewiew 
of Economic  Studies 15,  no.  1 (1947):  16; J.  de  V.  Graaff,  “On 
Optimum  Tariff  Structures,”  Review of Economic Studies 17. 
nd.  1 (1949):  53;  and  H.  G.  Johnson,“Alternative  Optimum 
Tariff  Formulae.”  in his  Intmrational  Trade andEconomic Ghwth 
(London:  George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1958),  p.  60. 
CONCLUSION 
The  impression  conveyed  by  textbooks  not- 
withstanding,  economists  hardly  had to wait until  the 
1940s  to  obtain  theoretical  models  of the  optimum 
tariff.  On  the  contrary,  the  key  components  of such 
models  already  had  been  assembled  long  before. 
Robert  Torrens  in the  1840s  supplied  two elements, 
namely  the  notions  that  reciprocal  demands  deter- 
mine  the  terms  of trade  and  that  tariffs  affect  those 
reciprocal  demands  thus  giving policymakers  a means 
of manipulating  the  terms  of trade.  John  Stuart  Mill 
showed  in  an  essay  published  in  1844  that  an  ex- 
port  tax works  as well  as an import  tariff  to improve 
the  terms  of trade  and that  the  extent  of the  improve- 
ment  depends  crucially  on the  size of the  coefficients 
of elasticity  of demand.  Alfred  Marshall  in the  1870s 
translated  the  Torrens-Mill  analysis  into  graphical 
form  thus  establishing  the  reciprocal  demand  or 
offer  curves  used  in modern  models  of the  optimum 
tariff.  To  Marshall’s  reciprocal  demand  schedules 
Edgeworth  in  1894  added  trade  indifference  curves 
thus  allowing one  to identify  in principle  the particular 
tariff  rate  that  maximizes  national  gain.  Finally, 
C. F. Bickerdike  in the  early  1900s  added  three  more 
components  to the  theory:  he proved  mathematically 
that  a  tariff  could  improve  national  welfare,  he 
presented  alternative  measures  of the  resulting  gain, 
and he derived  the  algebraic  formula  for the  optimum 
tariff  rate.  He  also  showed  that  the  optimum  tariff 
restrains  competition  among  individual  importers  and 
exporters  so that  the  dutying  country  acts  as a cartel 
exploiting  its market  power  to improve  the  terms  of 
trade. 
Except  for  Torrens  and  Bickerdike,  these  same 
economists  also  specified  the  basic  shortcomings  of 
optimum  tariff  theory.  The  theory,  they  noted, 
assumes  unrealistically  (1) that  foreign  countries  will 
not  retaliate  with  tariffs  of  their  own,  (2)  that 
elasticities  of supply  and demand  in foreign  trade  are 
not  so  large  in  the  long  run  as  to  render  the  tariff 
ineffective,  (3)  that  the  optimum  tariff  rate  can  be 
precisely  identified  and  skillfully  administered,  and 
(4) that  politicians  can  resist  pressures  to raise  tariff 
rates  above  the  optimum  level.  None  of  these 
assumed  conditions,  they  felt,  were  likely  to  be 
realized  in  practice.  They  further  pointed  out  that 
a tariff  can  benefit  no  nation  except  at  the  cost  of 
greater  injury  to  others  and  is  thus  unacceptable 
from  a cosmopolitan  point  of view.  For  these  reasons 
they  remained  convinced  that,  despite  the  theoretical 
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